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We develop a Roy model of social interactions in which individuals sort into peer groups based on
comparative advantage. Two key results emerge: First, when comparative advantage is the guiding
principle of peer group organization, the effect of moving a student into an environment with higher-achieving
peers depends on where in the ability distribution she falls and the effective wages that clear the social
market. In this sense our model may rationalize the widely varying estimates of peer effects found
in the literature without casting group behavior as an externality in agents' objective functions. Second,
since a student's comparative advantage is typically unobserved, the theory implies that important
determinants of individual choice operate through the error term and may, even under random assignment,
be correlated with the regressor of interest. As a result, linear in means estimates of peer effects are
not identified. We show that the model's testable prediction in the presence of this confounding issue–an
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For centuries, social scientists have recognized the importance of social interactions (see , for in-
stance, Rousseau 1762, pp.789).1 Mill (1859), for instance, laments not only the tyranny of govern-
ment, but also the tyranny of social norms. More recently, Gans (1962) describes an insidious form
of social interactions in which Italian immigrant communities in Boston’s West End impose costs on
individuals who “act mobile.”2 Wilson (1987) provides qualitative evidence that the development
of an “underclass” of black city dwellers on Chicago’s South Side was due to the emigration of
working families and the resulting decrease in role models and neighborhood quality; and Borjas
(1995) demonstrates that the mean skill level within one’s ethnic group in the previous generation
is correlated with own educational achievement.3
To better understand these phenomena, economists have developed models of social interactions
by putting environmental variables, such as the mean behavior in one’s social group or the mean
educational attainment in one’s neighborhood, into agents’ utility functions.4 In this class of models,
peers are a source of monotonic externalities; unruly peers cause more trouble and smarter peers
encourage higher academic achievement (Akerlof 1997, Becker 1974, 1996, Benabou 1993, Bernheim
1994). Importantly, these externalities are simply assumed. Becker and Murphy (2000) call this
sort of complementarity between individual actions and those of one’s peers "the fundamental
assumption in analyzing the inﬂuence of social capital...on closely related behavior” (p.9).
Empirical evidence in favor of models which predict that favorable social interactions lead to
positive outcomes has been ambivalent. While many authors conﬁrm the hypothesis using data sets
ranging from primary and secondary students in Texas to freshmen in the US Air Force Academy
(Carrell et al. 2009, Hanushek et al. 2003, Hoxby 2000, Hoxby and Weingarth 2005, Duﬂoe ta l .
2008, Imberman et al. 2009, Goux and Maurin 2007), others ﬁnd no evidence of peer eﬀects or
occasional negative eﬀects from increases in the peer group mean (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006, Kang
2007, Angrist and Lang 2004, Carrell et al. 2010).
In this paper we take a primitive view of social interactions using insights from neoclassical
economics. Modelling the endogneity of contacts within narrowly deﬁned social settings we posit
the existence of a ‘market for peers’ analogous to a traditional labor market. In the spirit of Becker
(1965), agents derive utility from ﬁnal goods produced by combining time and market inputs.
1Manski (1993) partitions the space of social interactions into three categories: endogenous eﬀects, exogenous
eﬀe c t s ,a n dc o r r e l a t e de ﬀects. Endogenous eﬀects occur when an individual’s behavior is directly inﬂuenced by that
of her peers. Exogenous (or contextual) eﬀects occur when individual behavior is inﬂuenced by group composition or
neighborhood characteristics. Correlated eﬀects are present when individual and group behavior are related because
peers share similar traits. We will not attempt to distinguish these important channels. In what follows, all of these
categories interact to determine behavior through an equilibrium mechanism.
2Many ethnographers describe similar phenomena around the globe: the Buraku Outcastes of Japan (Devos and
Wagasutma 1966); Blacks in America (Fordham and Ogbu 1986), the Maori of New Zealand (Chapple, Jeﬀeries,
and Walker 1997), Blacks on Chicago’s south side circa 1930 (Drake and Cayton 1945), the working class in Britain
(Willis 1977), among others.
3See Durlauf (2004) for a careful review of the literature on peer eﬀects in education, crime, welfare participation,
and health.
4Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005), Berman (2000), and Iannaccone (1992) are notable exceptions.
2Production of ﬁnal goods, however, occurs in peer groups, which we cast as ﬁrms in a two sector
Roy model (Roy 1951). Our focus is on equilibria in which the eﬀect of peers is mediated through
an implicit price mechanism akin to Becker (1973); an agent’s contribution to group production
determines the share of output she receives.
In equilibrium, heterogeneity in ability leads to individuals selecting into sectors based on
comparative advantage. The direction and magnitude of the impact of social interactions depends
on the shape of the production functions as well as the ability distribution. We characterize
equilibria under two diﬀerent assumptions: (i) industry production functions are concave in labor
inputs, (ii) production functions are convex. Since the number of complexities to generalize the
model is only bounded by one’s ability to reinterpret variables from classical price theory, we limit
the model to these basic characteristics. In Appendix B, we extend the basic model to allow for
many sectors and -dimensional skill (Heckman and Scheinkman 1987), hierarchies and endogenous
group size (Rosen 1982), and show that the basic results of our model hold when the sectoral choice
problem is cast in a general social multiplier model (Becker and Murphy 2000, Glaeser, Sacerdote,
and Scheinkman 2003).5
It is important to emphasize at the outset that there are no intrinsic externalities or comple-
mentarities built into the model. When comparative advantage is the guiding principle of peer
group organization, the eﬀect of moving a student to an environment with higher-achieving peers
is an equilibrium outcome. An individual’s behavior depends on where in the new distribution
she lands, and on the eﬀective ‘wages’ that clear the social market. Put diﬀerently, selection into
peer group roles is determined by the intersection of supply and demand for various skills; and
peer eﬀects are obtained through market prices. Thus, peer quality might be a source of linear or
non-linear, positive, or even negative externalities. If the demand function is approximately linear,
for instance, the model predicts peer quality to exhibit positive and linear eﬀects. Conversely, if
production is subject to strong diminishing marginal returns, the model predicts estimates of peer
eﬀects to diﬀer in size and magnitude depending on the location of the initial equilibrium and the
nature of the underlying ability distribution. Eﬀects that are non-linear and negative can arise if
the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ curves shift in opposite directions. In this sense, the model may ratio-
nalize the widely varying results on peer eﬀects found in the empirical literature without appealing
to externalities.
Moreover, our Roy model of social interactions has implications for the identiﬁcation of peer
eﬀects. Social wages and a student’s comparative advantage are typically unobserved, which im-
plies that key determinants of individual choice operate through the error term. Moreover, these
unobservables may vary only on the school or neighborhood level and will, even under random
assignment, be correlated with the regressor of interest (e.g., poverty rates, or the mean behavior
of other students). Therefore, identiﬁcation of neighborhood and peer eﬀects may be more diﬃcult
5Other possible extensions would allow individuals to invest in human capital (see Becker 1964, Ben-Porath 1967,
Rosen 1972), or to search for a peer group within and across sectors (Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b, Miller 1984, Neal
1999). To understand the implications of the sorting of individuals into groups when membership is costly and
beneﬁts depend monotonically on group composition see Cutler and Glaeser (1997).
3than Manski (1993) describes–one not only has to solve the reﬂection problem and deal with the
systematic sorting of individuals into peer groups, but one must also account for the presence of
group level unobservables that determine behavior. Even if individual behavior were to depend
directly on the group mean, we show that when contacts in the social market are endogenous the
parameters of interest are typically not identiﬁed. We leave the development of general conditions
for identiﬁcation in the presence of these unobservables for another occasion, and pursue the more
modest goal of providing evidence consistent with our model’s key prediction: Since similar individ-
uals facing the same social wages have a common comparative advantage, all else equal, a student’s
proclivity to ‘act out’ should be correlated with her ordinal rank in the ability distribution.
Using two data sources, New York City Public Schools administrative records (NYCPS) and
the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS), we demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, indi-
viduals’ academic rank signiﬁcantly aﬀects the probability of exhibiting problem behaviors. In the
NYCPS data, which contain information on the same students gathered at multiple points in time,
we exploit transitions from elementary school (5th grade) to middle school (6th grade) to estimate
that a ﬁfty percentile decrease as opposed to a ﬁfty percentile increase in rank among schoolmates
( p r e s u m a b l yf r o mm o v i n gt oad i ﬀerent school with more academically able peers) is associated
with roughly a ﬁve percentage point increase in the probability of a serious behavioral incident (on
a base of eight percent). In doing so, we are able to control for student speciﬁc determinants of
behavior, but not for systematic choice of school. To account for systematic sorting into schools,
we use a student’s hypothetical change in rank if they attended their zoned school (i.e. the default
school based on their physical address) as an instrument for actual change in rank based on the
school they choose to attend. This approach supports our ﬁndings.
Our second dataset is the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS). NELS allows us
to relate a student’s behavior in diﬀerent classrooms to a proxy for her course speciﬁcr a n k . W e
show that a ﬁfty percentile decline in rank across classes is associated with a ten percentage points
higher probability that the teacher reports behavioral problems in the course for which she has the
lower rank (on a base of forty percent).
While these data are inconsistent with models that predict peer quality to exhibit positive
monotonic externalities (e.g., Becker 1996), we urge the reader to interpret our ﬁndings with two
important caveats. First, as mentioned above, the estimates are not well identiﬁed peer eﬀects.
Second, models which predict negative peer externalities (e.g., smarter peers may decrease achieve-
ment) might also be consistent with our results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our formal model,
provides conditions that can explain the widely varying estimates found in the literature, and
explores the implications of the comparative advantage approach for predicting the eﬃcacy of social
programs ex ante. Section 3 discusses identiﬁcation of peer eﬀects in the presence of comparative
advantage, and shows evidence from two large data sets that is consistent with our model. Section
4 concludes. There are two appendices. Appendix A describes the data used in our analysis and
how we construct our samples. Appendix B contains additional formal results omitted from the
4body of the paper.
2 The Market for Peers
2.1 The Basic Model
The economic model we propose in this section is a simpliﬁed version of the well-known multi-
sector choice problem, and builds upon impressive literatures designed to understand the evolution
of earnings, the (hedonic) pricing of skills, and the assignment of workers to ﬁrms (e.g., Ben-Porath
1967, Heckman and Sedlacek 1985, Heckman and Scheinkman 1987, Murphy 1986, Rosen 1974,
1982, 1983, Roy 1951, Sattinger 1979, 1993, Tinbergen 1956, and Willis and Rosen 1979). The
novelty in our approach lies in the application of these classic methods to develop a theory of
social interactions where contacts within a social market are endogenous and peer quality does
not act as a direct externality. The paper most similar to ours is Heckman and Sedlacek (1985),
who develop an equilibrium model of self-selection in the labor market. We extend Heckman and
Sedlacek (1985) by considering the case of increasing returns to scale on the industry level, but we
cannot implement their empirical exercise because we observe neither ‘social wages’ nor individuals’
choices of sectors directly.
A. Building Blocks
Let there be a continuum of agents with unit mass. Every agent is endowed with one unit of
(non-transferable) time. There are two activities in which agents can engage with their peers:
studying or mischief. These activities are exclusive and undertaken by separate social groups in
one of two sectors: ‘nerds’ and ‘troublemakers’.6 Each sector, indexed by  ∈ {}, combines the
eﬀective units of its members’ time with another input we label ‘capital’ according to a general, twice
continuously diﬀerentiable industry production function  (  ).L e t denote a technology
shifter, such as school or neighborhood quality, or the quantity of policing.  represents the total
supply of eﬀective labor units to sector ,a n d denotes the supply of eﬀective capital. We allow
capital to broadly represent any non-human input into groups’ production (e.g., textbooks, sharp
scissors, but also labor market conditions, or expectations thereof).
Agents are heterogenous along two dimensions. Their varying size and strength yield diﬀerences
in the ability to cause trouble, whereas heterogeneity in cognitive ability implies diﬀerences in their
ability to be a true nerd. Let the continuous function ():[ 0 1] → R+ denote the eﬀective units
of ‘nerdiness’ that agent  is capable of contributing to the group (e.g., expertise in diﬀerential
geometry). Analogously, agent ’s troublemaking ability is given by ():[ 0 1] → R+.W e
assume that agents are solely interested in maximizing their social income
 ()=m a x{()  ()}
6Appendix B details an -sector analog to our basic model.
5where  and  are the market clearing wages for eﬀective units of nerd and troublemaking labor,
respectively. As in Welch (1969), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), and Heckman and Scheinkman
(1987), earnings follow the linear in characteristics approach developed by Gorman (1980) and
Lancaster (1966). Note that there are no explicit peer externalities built into agent’s utility. That
is, given  and , the behavior of one’s peers has no inﬂuence on own decisions. In section 2.4,
we relax this assumption and allow for more general utility functions (e.g. individuals care about
more than just social income in school). Here, however, we present a very simple and parsimonious
model to demonstrate that sorting into peer groups alone can produce “peer eﬀects” and may help
reconcile much of the conﬂicting empirical literature.
Individuals maximize their social income by choosing either the nerd or troublemaking sector
according to a simple cut-oﬀ rule (Roy 1951). Let () ≡
()
() denote agent ’s skill as a nerd
relative to that as a troublemaker, and order agents such that 0() ≥ 0. The agent indiﬀerent





All individuals with index  ≥ ∗ join forces with the nerds, and individuals with  ∗ become trou-
blemakers. In our price theory of social interactions, comparative (rather than absolute) advantage
determines an individual’s choice of sector.










 ().( 3 )
Equations (2) and (3) characterize the supply side in the market for peers. Equilibrium, however,
also depends on the demand side, and therefore on the shape of the industry production functions.
Below, we consider cases in which production is concave or convex in labor inputs.
B. Concavity in Labor Inputs
In the theory of the ﬁrm, it is assumed that labor exhibits diminishing returns to scale in labor on
the ﬁrm as well as the industry level. If, for instance, increasing the number of trouble makers does
more to increase the probability of getting caught than of winning a ﬁght, then the production
function in the troublemaking sector will be concave in . In equilibrium, competition in the










6With free entry into both the nerd and troublemaking sectors, individual peer groups earn zero
proﬁts. That is, all output is divided among group members.7





( (∗)  )
= (∗) (5)
where  ():[ 0 1] → R+ denotes the ratio of marginal products in both sectors when the threshold
index separating sectors is .S i n c e0 () ≤ 0 for all , the ‘demand curve’ in the market for peers
is (weakly) downward sloping.8 To see this, note that equations (2) and (3) respectively imply

  0 and 
  0; and concavity of the industry production functions causes the ratio of
marginal products to decrease as labor shifts from the nerd into the troublemaking sector. We can
now describe equilibrium graphically.
Figure 1 shows equilibrium in the basic model when production is concave in labor inputs.
As described above, it features downward sloping demand and upward sloping supply. There is a
unique equilibrium at ∗ with market clearing relative prices, 

∗
 determined by the intersection of
supply and demand. All individuals with  ∗ select into the troublemaker sector and individuals
with  ≥ ∗ choose to be nerds.
Suppose there is a shift in troublemaking technology–less police surveillance or an increase
in the availability of weapons–holding everything else constant. An increase in troublemaking
technology is represented by an outward shift of the -schedule in Figure 1, which results in higher
relative wages for troublemakers and fewer nerds. A decrease in troublemaking technology has the
opposite eﬀect: an inward shift of the -schedule, a decrease in the relative wages of troublemakers,
and an increase in the number of agents who choose to become nerds.
Comparative statics with respect to the skill disribution, however, can be more counterintuitive.
Consider, for instance, an increase in nerd skill among the population holding troublemaking skills
ﬁxed. First, an increase in agents’ nerdiness shifts the supply curve inward (from () to ()0).
Second, the demand curve shifts outwards (from  () to  ()
0 )d u et ot h ef a c tt h a tw i t hm o r e
academically able peers there will be more eﬃciency units of nerd skill supplied at any .W h i l e
both shifts lead to an unambigous rise in the relative wage of troublemakers, the eﬀect on quantities
in indeterminate.
Figure 2 illustrates the situation. In Panel A, the wage from being a nerd drops more rapidly
with eﬀective labor in the sector, leading to a larger outward shift of ()0, which is one factor
contributing to the overall contraction in the nerd sector. The other contributing factor is that
the increase in nerd skill comes disproportionately from the upper end of the distribution, so that
the expansion in  is larger at the upper end of the distribution, and the intersection of the two
7Assuming identical peer groups within sectors, the number of groups adjusts such that  (  )=,w h e r e
 is the ﬁxed cost of operating in sector , and lower case symbols denote the group level analog of their upper case
counterparts. Following Rosen (1982), Appendix B endogenizes group size and hierarchies within groups.
8Technically a demand curve gives the quantity demanded at a particular price, all else equal. (), however,
denotes the marginal individual consistent with a certain wage ratio. Therefore,  should more appropriately be
thought of as demand side equilibrium schedule.
7curves is therefore further to the right.9 I nP a n e lB ,s o c i a lw a g e sa r el e s sr e s p o n s i v et os e c t o rl a b o r
supply, and the increase in skill is more concentrated to the left of the initial equilibrium. While
counterintuitive, an overall increase in the nerd skills actually yields an expansion in the size of the
nerd sector.
C. Convexity in Labor Inputs
The assumption that the marginal utility of a social activity is increasing in overall participation
has been the focus of much of the work on social interactions. Study groups allow students to
beneﬁt from division of labor on a lab project, and ensure individual students do not waste time
stuck on a question to which someone else in the group knows the answer (Lazear 2001).
In the traditional theory of the ﬁrm, increasing returns to scale on the industry level imply
that there exists only one ﬁrm per sector because one large ﬁrm will produce more eﬃciently than
multiple smaller ones. One way to reconcile increasing returns to scale on the industry level with
the existence of many ﬁrms in a competitive market is the concept of external increasing returns to
scale pioneered by Marshall (1890) and formalized by Ethier (1982a, 1982b). The key idea is that
individual ﬁrms are price takers and produce subject to diminishing marginal returns, but their
activities exhibit positive externalities strong enough to cause marginal returns on the industry level
to increase. Suppose, for instance, that the size of the market or the cost of production depend on
the number of ﬁrms–say, because more ﬁrms invest in a new, more eﬃcient technology–and that
ﬁrms fail to internalize this spill-over eﬀect. Then, production might exhibit increasing returns to
scale at the industry level, but decreasing marginal returns at the ﬁrm level (Murphy et al. 1989).
Another example of external economies, due to Marshall (1890), are advances in “trade-knowledge”
which might be hard to keep secret from ﬁrms within the same industry.10
In the market for peers we assume that production is concave on the peer group level, but
convex on that of the industry. The activities of one large troublemaker group might be harder to
coordinate than those of a smaller one leading to a higher risk of getting caught for any individual
member. However, more troublemakers at a school can divert teachers’ attention and thereby
reduce others’ probability of punishment. Yet, the inability to coordinate eﬃciently precludes
individual groups from becoming too large and reaping the full beneﬁts of increasing returns to
scale at the industry level. Therefore, there exist multiple independent peer groups within a sector,
each of which takes the size of the industry as well as the prevailing wages as given (see Becker
9Note that eﬀective labor in the nerd sector is integrated on [
∗1],s ot h a tt h es h i f ti n will be larger for any 
∗
the more concentrated a given increase in the distribution of  is in the upper end of the distribution.
10Starting with Arrow (1962) and Ethier (1982a) externalities have often been used to model equilibria in which
ﬁrms compete against each other in the presence of increasing returns to scale. Romer (1986, 1987), Lucas (1988), and
Prescott and Boyd (1987), for instance, demonstrate the importance of knowledge accumulation and specialization
for economic growth. Murphy et al. (1989) argue that increasing retruns in the form of aggregate demand spill-overs
might explain why some countries appear to be stuck in a unindustrialized equilibrium. Krugman (1991) shows how
increasing returns to scale shape economic geography. In the literature on international trade external increasing
returns to scale have, for instance, been used to explain the pattern of trade between developed countries (see Helpman
1984 and Krugman 1995 for reviews). For a model of trade in which returns to scale are internal to ﬁrms see Krugman
(1979).
8and Murphy 1992 on the trade-oﬀ between returns to scale due to specialization and coordination
costs).
Assuming that the industry production function is convex in labor adds one additional wrinkle.
Since peer groups do not take the positive externalities of their hiring decisions into account, the
marginal product of labor is smaller on the group than on the industry level. Thus, in equilibrium,
wages cannot equal the marginal product of labor for the whole industry. Instead, under free entry
into the market for peers, a zero-proﬁt condition determines equilibrium wages. As in the case
of concave production, we assume that all industry output goes to the agents in the particular
sector.11
Let proﬁts in sector  be given by
 =  (  ) −  (6)











 (  )
where 













() ≥ 0 for all . In words, the convexity assumption implies that the ratio of marginal
products increases as labor ﬂows from the nerd to the troublemaking sector. Thus, under increasing
returns to scale in labor, the ‘demand’ schedule is upward sloping.
Figure 3 depicts equilibrium and illustrates the comparative statics under increasing returns to
scale. The key diﬀerence, when production is convex, is that there may exist multiple equilibria.
Suﬃcient conditions are readily derived.
Proposition 1 There exist at least two equilibria with a positive mass of both nerds and trouble-
makers if:
()  (0) (0)(1) (1) and  () () for any  ∈ (01)
or if
()  (0) (0)(1) (1)and  () () for any  ∈ (01)
T h e r ee x i s t sa tl e a s to n ee q u i l i b r i u mw i t hap o s itive mass of both nerds and troublemakers, and
11The following derivations do not depend on the absence of proﬁts in equilibrium. An alternative assumption
leaving our conclusions essentially unaﬀected would be that labor is compensated with a ﬁxed share of revenues.
12Since ﬁrms within a sector take wages as given and compete for labor, wages are also equal to the marginal
product of labor on the ﬁrm level. In equilibrium the number of ﬁrms must adjust such that each of them earns zero
proﬁts.
9another one in which all agents become either nerds or troublemakers if
()  (1) (1) and  () () for any  ∈ (01)
or if
()  (0) (0) and  () () for any  ∈ (01)
Proof. By continuity of  and  the proof follows immediately from the Intermediate Value
Theorem and by recognizing that if  (1) ≥ (1) or  (0) ≤ (0) a corner solution may obtain.
Figure 3 depicts a scenario in which increasing marginal product yields multiple equlibria — at
the origin, ∗,a n d∗0. Only equilibria in which the ‘demand curve’ intersects the ‘supply curve’ from
above are locally stable. To see this, consider the adjustment process following a small shock to
wages. From the initial equilibrium at ∗, a small decrease in relative wages (along the -schedule)
will lead to labor ﬂowing out of the troublemaking and into the nerd sector, which will cause relative
wages to decline further and lead to even more agents switching sectors. The process continues until
the market reaches a new equilibrium at the origin. Conversely, a small increase in wages (along
the -schedule) will lead to labor ﬂowing into the troublemaking sector. This causes relative wages
to increase even more, thereby inducing more nerds to become troublemakers until the market
reaches equilibrium at ∗0. Similar reasoning shows that the equilibrium at ∗0 is stable. Given the
existence of multiple equilibria, our model may rationalize starkly diﬀerent behaviors of agents in
observationally similar markets.13
The case of convex production is closely related to models of a ‘social multiplier’ (Becker and
Murphy 2000, Glaeser et al. 2003). In these models, social spillover eﬀects arise because an
individual’s marginal utility from taking a partic u l a ra c t i o ni sa s s u m e dt oi n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e r
of agents in her reference group who behave in the same way. In our model, an agent’s productivity
increases as others join the same sector, which raises her wage and thereby the net utility gain from






























for  6= 0. That is, the net utility from choosing sector  over 0 increases in the amount of labor
employed in . Our theory could thus be interpreted as providing alternative micro-foundations
for the assumption of increasing marginal utility.14 Here, however, the ability to sort into social
sectors has the potential to obfuscate the complementarity between individual and group behavior.
13When the marginal product for one social sector is increasing while the other is decreasing, the relative demand
schedule may alternate between sloping upwards and downwards.
14In Appendix B, we show our core results hold when introducing a second social activity to a general social
multiplier model.
102.2 Reinterpreting the Peer Eﬀects Literature Through the Lens of a Roy
Model
There is a large literature on peer eﬀects in schools, neighborhoods, and other venues in which indi-
viduals interact. Surprisingly, research designs which exploit experimental and quasi-experimental
variation often point in conﬂicting directions with comparable samples. In this section we show
that our Roy model of social interactions is ﬂexible enough to reconcile the seemingly disparate
evidence. Put diﬀerently, we show that a model in which ‘peer eﬀects’ are due to the systematic
sorting of individuals within social markets can produce the same empirical patterns that have
traditionally been attributed to models in which peer eﬀects take the form of direct externalities.
We divide the empirical literature on peer eﬀects into four mutually exclusive categories: analy-
s e st h a tr e p o r tn os i g n i ﬁcant peer eﬀects, eﬀects which are linear and positive (i.e. smarter peers
increase achievement), eﬀects that are non-linear and positive, and analyses that ﬁnd negative peer
eﬀects.
In what follows we assume that production functions are concave in labor inputs and provide
suﬃcient conditions for our model to reconcile the ﬁndings of various studies.15 We do not attempt
to explain every nuance in the empirical literature on peer eﬀects. For sure, there exist several
competing models all of which can explain some aspect in isolation. Our goal is to develop a
tractable model which can reconcile broad but seemingly disparate ﬁndings.
A. No Peer Effects
One strand of the literature argues that peer eﬀects are negligible (Angrist and Lang 2004,
Cullen et al. 2006, Evans et al. 1992, Lefgren 2004, Lyle 2007, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
2006). Angrist and Lang (2004) evaluate Boston’s Metco program, which buses minority students
from high poverty neighborhoods in Boston to wealthier suburban schools. Their results indicate
that, although the new Metco students are on average lower achieving, the change in peer group
induced by these students does not aﬀect test scores of elementary and middle school students in
the suburban schools. Cullen et al. (2005) analyze roughly ﬁfteen thousand students who applied
to nineteen schools through the Chicago Public Schools choice program. Using data from lotteries,
their results imply that the academic impact of attending a new school with higher-performing
peers is negligible.
Using solely the lens and language of our model, this implies that the marginal student, ∗,
in these settings remains the same notwithstanding a change in peer group composition. Hence,
the choice of sector for all other individuals does not change as well. To see why this might be
the case in practice, consider Boston’s Metco program (cf. Angrist and Lang 2004). A potential
explanation for the lack of peer eﬀects in this study is that Metco students are few relative to
non-Metco ones. Despite the fact that average ability declines and both the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’
15It is straightforward to conduct an identical analysis under the assumption of convex production functions, which
we leave to the reader.
11curves shift downward, the impact of Metco students on relative wages is likely small. As the
relative ability of their non-Metco peers remains the same, our model predicts that almost none of
them change sectors, leading to negligible peer eﬀects.
Figure 4 illustrates this point. Imagine an increase in the number of Metco students, which
shifts the supply curve downward (from  to 0) and the demand side equilibrium schedule from 
inward to 0. Notice, large shifts only occur to the left of the initial equilibrium. If this is indeed
what happened, then it is not surprising that the marginal student would remain virtually the
same.
B. Linear in Means
Another portion of the peer eﬀects literature shows that peer eﬀects operate linearly, typically
based on mean group characteristics. Hanushek et al. (2003) show, in a large matched panel data
set of third through sixth graders in Texas public schools, that a one standard deviation increase in
mean peer test score results in a .20 standard deviation increase in own test scores. Hoxby (2000)
uses year to year variation in class-level gender and race composition; ﬁnding eﬀects that range
from .15 to .40 points for every one point increase in the class mean reading score.16
Through the lens of our model, this implies that a constant fraction of individuals shift sectors
for every one unit increase in peers’ mean test score. Figure 5 shows an example in which peer
eﬀects would operate linearly. In this example, the supply schedule (i.e. the distribution of relative
ability) shifts almost parallel close to the initial equilibrium. Furthermore, the demand curve has
constant negative slope around the initial equilibrium and is relatively unresponsive to shifts labor
supply. Therefore, changes in peer ability lead to constant changes in relative wages, and a constant
fraction of individuals switch sectors–resulting in linear peer eﬀects.17
An explanation along these lines may partially explain the results of Hoxby (2000). As Hoxby
(2000) identiﬁes peer eﬀects through plausibly random variation in gender and race composition in
classrooms, it may be reasonable to assume that, over the relevant range, the ability distribution
shifts one-to-one with its mean. Moreover, given the limited variation in cohorts’ gender and racial
composition, the demand schedule might be approximately linear in a neighborhood around the
‘initial equilibrium’. Whether these or equivalent conditions do indeed hold in Hoxby (2000), or in
any other analysis which reports linear peer eﬀects, is unknown.
C. Heterogeneous Positive Effects
A third category of the literature describes positive, but non-linear peer eﬀects. Hoxby and
Weingarth (2005), for instance, exploit a desegregation program in Wake County, NC, which pro-
duces exogenous changes in classroom peer groups. They ﬁnd that based on a linear-in-means model
16Other contributions in this vein include Boozer and Cacciola (2001), Gaviria and Raphael (2001), Kang (2007),
and Goux and Maurin (2007).
17We emphasize that the conditions we provide in the text are suﬃcient, but in no way necessary.
12a student’s test score is expected to increase .25 standard deviations given a 1 standard deviation
increase in peers’ mean score. However, when they allow their results to diﬀer depending on the
decile of peer performance, they ﬁnd that students beneﬁtm o r ef r o mp e e r sw i t ha na c h i e v e m e n t
level similar to theirs. For example, students in the bottom decile beneﬁt most from the addition
of students in the second and third deciles (a 10% increase in peers at the 15th percentile increases
their performance by .19 standard deviations more than an additional 10% of students in the 8th
decile). Carrell et al. (2009) investigate peer eﬀects among freshmen at the Air Force Academy
who are randomly assigned to squadrons. They show that a one standard deviation increase in
peers’ average verbal SAT score results in a .565 standard deviation increase in freshman fall GPA
for students in the bottom third of the expected achievement distribution compared to .361 and
.312 for those in the middle and top third. Using Census data, Crane (1991) shows that the fraction
of high-status workers in a neighborhood is negatively related to the likelihood of teen pregnancy
and dropping out of school. These eﬀects become much stronger at the lowest levels of high-status
workers.18
Figure 6 considers a scenario consistent with the results of Crane (1991) under the auspices of our
model. The left panel depicts the situation in a neighborhood with a large number of high achievers
(e.g., nerds in the language of the previous section). An increase in the presence of highly skilled
individuals (shifting  to 0) marginally decreases ∗. The right panel features an identical inward
shift of the supply curve, but a substantially larger increase in the nerd sector. The heterogenous
eﬀects for a given change in supply are due to the conﬂuence of a concave relative demand curve, so
that demand is more ‘elastic’ in Panel B, and that the initial size of the nerd sector is smaller. Thus
the shift in relative supply is actually larger in the neighborhood of the marginal ∗. Taken together,
these structural diﬀerences in market for peers yields markedly diﬀerent behavioral responses to an
identical change in skill composition.
D. Heterogeneous Negative Effects
In stark contrast to the previously mentioned studies, a nascent literature provides credible
evidence that own achievement might decline in peer quality. Lavy et al. (2009) use a sample of
over a million students taking British age-14 tests to examine peer eﬀects in English high schools.
Exploiting the fact that students in their sample enter high school, and thus encounter a peer group
that is 87% new on average, they demonstrate that peer eﬀects are diﬀerent for boys and girls. Girls
are positively aﬀected by peers in the top 5% (.07 standard deviation for a 10% increase) while
boys are negatively aﬀected (-.05 standard deviations). For boys, the negative eﬀects are strongest
among those at the top of the achievement distribution.
Based on the non-linear results in Carrell et al. (2009), Carrell et al. (2010) implemented
an experiment at the US Air Force Academy aimed at increasing the GPA of incoming freshmen
who were predicted to fall in the bottom tercile of the achievement distribution. To achieve this
18S i m i l a rn o n - l i n e a rp e e re ﬀects are found in Burke and Sass (2008), Cooley (2010), Ding and Lehrer (2007), Duﬂo
et al. (2008), Figlio (2007), Imberman et al. (2009), Zimmer and Toma (2000), and Zimmerman (2003).
13goal squadrons in the treatment group were negatively sorted, while the composition of those in
the control group continued to be random. Yet, the experiment did not have the intended eﬀect.
Students in the treatment group projected to fall in the bottom tercile of the distribution, i.e. those
students the experiment was designed to help, experienced a .054 point decline in GPA compared
to their counterparts in the control group.
One possible explanation for these perplexing results is illustrated in Figure 7. In Panel A, we
consider a candidate relative supply distribution 0 w h e nas q u a d r o nh a sah i g hf r a c t i o no fh i g h
achieving cadets due to random assignment. Compared to the marginal distribution of the cohort
in bold lines, the higher fraction of cadets with high scores is due random assignment comes from
a reduction in the fraction of students from both the middle and bottom of the distribution. The
resulting equilibrium consists of a higher fraction of nerds in the squadron. The scores of those at
the bottom of the distribution improves due to either some actually associating with nerds, or due
to the fact that that their fellow troublemakers are more academically inclined. When squadrons
are arranged according to negative sorting, on the other hand, there is an increase in the fraction
of students from both the top and bottom tercile, as the distribution becomes -shaped when the
middle tercile is removed. This mean-preserving spread of the distribution has relative demands
at the boundaries equal to the marginal distribution, but is much ﬂatter in the interior. Instead of
exposing the more academically disadvantaged peers to talented study partners, the intra-squadron
social dynamics result in greater isolation from them.
Another striking example of peer eﬀects in this category comes from the Moving to Opportunity
(MTO) experiment which provided housing vouchers for families in high poverty neighborhoods in
Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City to relocate to lower poverty neighborhoods
(Kling et al. 2005, Kling et al. 2007). Evaluations of MTO show that female youth were aﬀected
positively by living in an ostensibly better neighborhood. Relative to the control group, female
youth are 6.9% less likely to have ever had anxiety symptoms, are 9.1% less likely to have consumed
alcohol during the past month, and have .08 fewer lifetime arrests for violent crimes. In contrast,
male youth are aﬀected negatively. Relative to the control group, male youth are 8.7% more likely
to have had serious nonsports accidents, are 10.3% more likely to have smoked during the past
month, and have .15 more lifetime arrests for property crimes.
Our model would predict the ﬁndings in MTO if relative wages increased (compared to the old
neighborhood) for boys, but decreased for girls. Figure 8 depicts shifts of the supply and demand
curves which could produce such a result. The top two panels refer to boys and the bottom two to
girls. The panels on the left illustrate the conditions in the pre-treatment neighborhood and the
panels on the right demonstrate an equilibrium in the treatment neighborhood. The set of students
who switch sectors is bounded by ∗, the marginal individual in the old neighborhood, and bye ,t h e
counterfactual marginal individual given the relative wages in the new environment. In moving to
the new neighborhood there are two opposing eﬀects on the relative demand schedule.The nerdier
population tends to shift the -schedule outwards, while at the same time greater educational
resources and supervision in the new neighborhood increase the relative returns to studying, which
14would shift the -schedule inwards. In contrast to models that predict a positive inﬂuence from
the new environment, here the direction of the treatment eﬀect is determined by the net eﬀect on
social wages.
In Figure 8, the inward shift in supply by going from one environment to the other is the same
for boys and girls. That is, boys and girls in the experimental group face the same set of smarter
peers after they move. If, however, the relative demand curve for girls shifts suﬃciently far inward
to overcome the outward shift in relative supply, then relative equilibrium wages move in opposite
directions. A smaller shift in the demand curve for boys could be caused by multiple factors. If
the nerd production function for girls is less concave with respect to labor, they will be less likely
to be competed out of the group in an environment with greater eﬀective supply. Conversely, if
the troublemaking production function for boys is more concave with respect to labor, the very
force that kept them from making trouble in their old neighborhood will raise the relative return
to doing so in the new neighborhood where such skills are scarce.
2.3 Predicting the Eﬃcacy of Social Interventions in the Presence of Compar-
ative Advantage
The fundamental problem our model highlights is that the treatment eﬀect of a social environment
is an endogenous process that is determined after any potentially random assignment to a neighbor-
hood, classroom, etc. Without observing social wages ex ante, there is no sure way of determining
which of the conditions outlined above will hold before a program commences. Ultimately, an
intervention’s eﬀect depends on production technologies, group speciﬁc capital, skill distributions,
and the resulting market clearing prices, all of which are generally unobserved. Thus, it may seem
that our theory has no ex ante predictions. This is only partially correct. Our model suggests
a heuristic that can potentially help policy makers predict outcomes of small scale interventions
which do not change equilibrium prices.
Using the lens of comparative advantage, if a policy maker is interested in predicting the be-
havior of a child after moving to a new neighborhood, a new school, or new classroom, then the
relevant statistic is the behavior of children with the same characteristics in the new environment.
The reason is simple: children with similar characteristics who face the same social wages will likely
have a common comparative advantage and can be expected to behave similarly.
The challenge is to ﬁnd a way to compare agents across markets. Let Θ denote the set of
individual characteristics which determine sectoral choice with intervention  This may include,
for example, test scores or innate ability in a school intervention, or height, weight, and motivation
in a neighborhood intervention. If one can identify Θ before an intervention commences, then
students can be matched across social markets and the heuristic is straightforward.
Consider a few thought experiments. If Θ is test scores, then one can compare individuals
across cities on their scores. If Θ is innate ability, methods developed in Hansen et al. (2004) to
extract measures of ability can be used to match individuals with the same ability across markets.
If Θ involves non-cognitive skills such as those psychologists often refer to as “The Big Five”–
15Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Emotional Stability (e.g., Digman
1990)–one can develop pre-intervention surveys along these dimensions and match students on
these ﬁve measures. Diﬃculties, however, arise when we have no theory or empirical evidence to
inform Θ In this case, one might use administrative or survey data to match on as many variables
as possible, recognizing that the prediction will have more noise.
Assuming Θ is in hand, and that we can calculate relative skill, () the prediction from our
heuristic is directly related to traditional program evaluations. Let  () be an indicator variable
equal to one if individual  chooses to be a nerd (and zero otherwise) in the old environment,
and let  0 () denote ’s choice in the new environment. Then the average treatment eﬀect from
manipulating the environment for all  is equal to
 = E
£
 0 () −  ()
¤
= ∗ − ∗0,
where ∗ and ∗0 denote the marginal individual in the old and new environment, respectively. In
words, the average treatment eﬀect is simply the fraction of individuals who switch sectors.
Interpreting our model more loosely, one could also think of outcomes (0 1) which are diﬀerent
from an agent’s actual choice of sector, but nevertheless depend on it. For instance, let 1 (|Ξ)
denote ’s test score (conditional on environmental variables Ξ)i f chooses to be a nerd, whereas
0 (|Ξ) is her potential outcome as a troublemaker. In this case, the average treatment eﬀect from








































where ∗ (·) denotes the marginal individual in a given environment, and 1{·} is an indicator function
equal to one if the condition in braces is satisﬁed. The ﬁrst and last row in the equation above
give the change in test scores for those individuals who do not switch sectors, whereas the middle
row denotes the change in the outcome for those agents who do switch sectors (e.g., for nerds who
become troublemakers or vice versa). Even if changing the environment from Ξ to Ξ0 is beneﬁcial
in the sense that it raises both 0 and 1 for every individual, the average treatment eﬀect could
still be negative if the diﬀerence between 0 and 1 (conditional on the environment) is suﬃciently
large compared to the eﬀect of environmental variables.
2.4 An Extension to the Basic Model
In this subsection, we outline an extension to the basic model presented above that recognizes the
tradeoﬀ that may exist between social activities and the ancillary costs or beneﬁts of associating
16with a social group. In particular, students may value good grades for their own sake, or for the
higher future standard of living that accompanies graduation. This raises the opportunity cost of
associating with troublemakers, and encourages association with nerds even in the presence of low
social wages.
To ﬁx ideas, one can think of  as the utility-scaled eﬀect that association with sector  ∈ {}
has on educational achievement or expected future income. To make the analysis tractable, we
assume linearity as well as additive separability in the utility derived from social income and that
incurred from . More speciﬁcally, agent ’s utility is given by
()= m a x
∈{}
{ ()+}.( 7 )
It follows straightforwardly that agent  will choose to become a troublemaker if and only if
 () −  () ≥  − 
In words, for  to join forces with the troublemakers it must be the case that the psychic
beneﬁt from joining, ( () −  ()), outweighs the utility loss due to lower achievement,
( − ).19
More generally, however, equilibrium is determined by the condition:
 (∗) (∗) −  (∗) (∗)= − ,( 8 )
where  (∗) denotes the equilibrium wage in sector . From our basic model we know that, given
social wages, the net psychic beneﬁtf r o mb e i n gat r o u b l e m a k e r ,i . e .t h el e f th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n
(8), is decreasing in an individual’s index, whereas the right handside is constant from individual
agents’ point of view. Hence, as before, individuals with index  ≤ ∗ become troublemakers, and
those for whom  ∗ choose the nerd sector. That is, equilibrium labor supply continues to be
given by equations (2) and (3), and equilibrium wages will be determined as described above.
The bottom line is that the intuition of our basic model — individuals choose sectors based
on their social income and this type of sorting can explain much of the evidence on peer eﬀects
without direct externalities — holds whenever (∗) −(∗) is suﬃciently small, or, more loosely,
the complimentarties are not “too strong.” However, if individuals are suﬃciently forward looking
and take into account important outcomes such as their future income in their current decision
making, our model of sorting cannot explain peer eﬀects. Thus, even in a world with important
complementarities, our model may be applicable to subgroups known to have high discount rates
(e.g., poor minorities, ) or age-groups that are suﬃciently myopic.
19Note that if (
∗) ≈ (
∗), then agents will base their choice of sector (almost) exclusively on diﬀerences in
social income, resembling our basic model. If, for instance, achievement is primarily determined by ability, or playing
video games and bullying equally distract from studying, then it might very well be the case that  and  are of
similar maginitude.
173 Empirical Implications
3.1 The Empirical Content of a Roy Model of Social Interactions
In the previous section we have outlined a new way of thinking about social interactions using
sorting and comparative advantage as the guiding principle of peer group organization. In this
section, we consider the implications of the comparative advantage approach for the identiﬁcation
of peer eﬀects. In doing so, we follow the literature and assume that there might exist other factors
besides social payoﬀs that determine the utility of being a troublemaker or a nerd, e.g., personal
and neighborhood characteristics, or the behavior of one’s peers.
To ﬁx ideas, consider a student’s choice of becoming a troublemaker, ,o ran e r d ,.L e t
X be a set of individual level covariates, and let Z denote factors varying only at the school,
neighborhood, or market level. Mean behavior in market  is given by ,a n d represents
an error term known to the individual, but not the econometrician. Intuitively,  captures all
unobserved factors inﬂuencing the diﬀerence in utility between  and . Student  chooses to
become a troublemaker if and only if
(;XZ) − (;XZ)= + X0
β0 + Z0
γ0 + 0 +  ≥ 0.( 9 )
Social wages and individual ability are typically not directly observable. Thus, the comparative
advantage approach can be viewed as providing a more explicit theory of the error term. Following
our theoretical model, decompose  into: the net market payoﬀ from being a troublemaker and
some other random variable:
 =( − )+ (10)
Note that only  and ,  ∈ {}, are possibly independent and identically distributed across
individuals, whereas  and  ( b o t ho fw h i c ha r em e a s u r e di nu t i l i t yu n i t s )v a r yo n l ya tt h e
market or group level. Therefore, our theory stipulates the existence of group level unobservables.
Recall, in the presence of group level unobservables not all parameters in the binary choice model
are identiﬁed from cross-sectional data (Blume et al. 2010, Brock and Durlauf 2007). While β0
can be consistently estimated without imposing parametric assumptions (using methods outlined
in Heckman 1990), γ0 and 0–the coeﬃcients of interest in the majority of applied work–cannot.
Nonidentiﬁcation is due to the fact that  depends on Z and  in an unknown way. Therefore,
only the linear combination of market level observables and unobservables is identiﬁed (see Brock
and Durlauf 2007 for a formal argument).
It is important to note that nonidentiﬁcation as a result of group level unobservables is quite
distinct from endogeneity due to systematic sorting of individuals into social markets (such as
neighborhoods and classrooms), or the reﬂection problem, which poses that 0 cannot be identiﬁed
if Z and  are linearly dependent (Manski 1993).20 While applied researchers have often found
20If Z exhibits suﬃcient variation and  6=0 , then the binary choice model of social interactions does not suﬀer
18clever strategies to deal with these two problems, group level unobservables have received much less
attention. However, there are several notable exceptions. Cooley (2010) motivates her instrument
in the presence of unobserved diﬀerences in teacher quality. Hoxby (2000) uses panel data to remove
the eﬀect of group level unobservables which do not vary over time; and Graham (2008) shows how
conditional variance restrictions can be used to identify endogenous peer eﬀects when individual
and group level unobservables are uncorrelated.
To appreciate the consequences of group level unobservables, denote ’s observed behavior by
 =
(
1 if (;XZ) − (;XZ) ≥ 0
0 otherwise
,
and consider the case in which there are no endogenous peer eﬀects, i.e. 0 =0 .B y t h e F r i s c h -
Waugh Theorem and assuming that Cov(X∗
 )=0 , the probability limit of the ordinary least
squares estimator of 0 from regressing  on X, Z,a n d equals












 denotes the residual from projecting  onto X and Z.O n l y i f ∗
 and  are
uncorrelated, will ˆ  be consistent.
To see that under the assumptions of our model Cov(∗
 )  0, condition on X and Z
and note that, according to (9), individual  in social market  chooses to become a troublemaker
i fa n do n l yi f
 ≥  (XZ) (11)
where  (XZ) ≡− ( + X0
β0 + Z0
γ0). Now, decompose  into the market speciﬁcm e a n
social payoﬀ, , and deviations around the mean, e , which are distributed according to some
cumulative distribution function Φ (·).T h a ti s ,l e t =  + e . With this notation in hand,
 =1i fa n do n l yi f
e  ≥  (XZ) − ,
and the fraction of individuals who are troublemakers in market  is equal to
 = EX [1 − Φ ( (XZ) − )].




  0,a s

  0. With this caveat in mind, it follows that Cov(∗
 )  0.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Under the assumptions of our model, a particular
behavior will be more prevalent in markets in which the social net payoﬀ to it is higher. It follows
that although endogenous social interactions might not be a driver of behavior, i.e. 0 =0 ,l i n e a r -
in-means estimates will be biased toward ﬁnding this form of peer eﬀects–even under random
from the reﬂection problem, as the limited range of the outcome rules out perfect linear dependence (Brock and
Durlauf 2007).
19assignment to social markets and if one resolves the reﬂection problem.
It is not the case, however, that all estimates of peer eﬀects are upward biased. Suppose, for
instance, that  denotes mean test scores in social market . As shown in Section 2, one cannot
sign the change in relative wages as the distribution of ability changes. Even if mean test scores
were a suﬃcient statistics for the whole ability distribution, we would not be able to determine the
covariance between ∗
 and . It is still the case, however, that (due to the presence of group
level unobservables) 0 and γ0 are not identiﬁed.
3.2 Evidence Consistent with a Roy Model Approach to Social Interactions
Lack of identiﬁcation does not imply that the comparative advantage approach has no empirical
content. As the net market payoﬀ to troublemakers is a declining function of nerd ability, even
purely ordinal information, such as a ranking of individuals, may be useful. For any set of equi-
librium prices, individuals with low cognitive ability are more likely to become troublemakers than
ones with high nerd ability. If comparative advantage shapes social interactions, then individual
behavior should depend on rank relative to others within the same market, and changes in rank
induced by moves across markets should be systematically related to changes in behavior. Hence,
our model predicts that, all else equal, an individual’s behavior should be related to her rank within
the relevant social market. For instance, children whose rank declines in transitioning from ele-
mentary to middle school should be more likely to develop behavioral problems than those whose
rank increases.
The ideal data to test our theory would span multiple markets–say, schools or classrooms–and
contain information on social wages, agents’ choices of sector as well as all of their skills. With
such data in hand we could test directly whether comparative advantage determines behavior by
comparing potential ‘social earnings’ across sectors and relating them to agents’ choices. Alterna-
tively, data on only a subset of skills, social wages and individuals’ choices of sector would allow
us to follow Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), who combine information on individual characteristics,
wages, sectoral choices, and aggregate wage bills to estimate a structural model of self-selection in
the labor market, as well as the demand for observed and unobserved skill. We are unaware of such
data.
In the absence of any information on social wages, and in lieu of imposing restrictive assumptions
to ensure identiﬁcation, we pursue the more modest goal of providing reduced form evidence which
suggests that, within a market, individual behavior depends on one’s rank. We leave the important
question surrounding identiﬁcation in the presence of group level unobservables for another occasion.
The evidence we present below is purely suggestive, as there exist several competing models that
share the same prediction. A trivial example is a model in which the intrinsic utility from being
a nerd depends on one’s class rank. Therefore, we urge caution when evaluating the empirical
evidence in favor of the comparative advantage approach.
In what follows, we investigate the relationship between a student’s relative academic ranking
and behavioral outcomes in two large data sets: New York City Public Schools (NYCPS) ad-
20ministrative data from 2003/04 through 2008/09, and the National Education Longitudinal Study
of 1988 (NELS). Since our theory predicts that this relationship can be non-linear we estimate
semi-parametric speciﬁcations, as described in Yatchew (1998).
A. Evidence from New York City Public Schools
The New York City Public Schools (NYCPS) data contain student-level administrative information
on approximately 1.1 million students across the ﬁve boroughs of the NYC metropolitan area. The
data include student race, gender, free and reduced-price lunch eligibility, behavior, attendance,
and matriculation with course grades for all students, as well as state math and English/Language
A r t s( E L A )t e s ts c o r e sf o rs t u d e nts in grades three through eight. We have NYCPS data spanning
the 2003/04 to 2008/09 school years. Summary statistics for the variables we use in our core
speciﬁcations are displayed in Appendix Table 1.
Using the NYCPS data, we estimate models of the form
∆ = (∆)+X0
 +  +     + ,( 1 2 )
restricting our attention to the set of students who change schools in the transition from elementary
to middle school. Our behavioral measure, , in each year is an indicator equal to one if a
student has at least one reported behavioral incident from that year and zero otherwise; ∆ ∈
{−101}. The three most common behavioral incidents in our data are “engaging in an altercation
or physically aggressive behavior with other student(s),” “behaving in a manner that disrupts
the educational process (horseplay),” or “engaging in verbally rude or disrespectful behavior /
insubordination.”
A student’s rank in ﬁfth grade is the student’s percentile ranking based on achievement on the
New York State exam relative to other students who are in the same school in ﬁfth grade.21 We
also compute each student’s position relative to peers in her sixth grade school using the ﬁfth grade
test scores. This captures the student’s ranking in the new school at the beginning of the school
year; ∆ denotes the diﬀerence between these two rankings. We report results using both math
and ELA scores to compute the change in percentile. Finally, we include school ﬁxed eﬀects (for
both a student’s elementary and middle school), year ﬁxed eﬀects, and a standard set of covariates
that includes the test score in the same subject from the previous year, an exhaustive set of race
dummies, sex, free lunch eligibility, English Language Learner (ELL) status, and special educa-
21The state math and ELA tests, developed by McGraw-Hill, are high-stakes exams conducted in the winters of
third through eighth grade. Students in third, ﬁfth, and seventh grades must score level 2 or above (out of 4) on both
tests to advance to the next grade without attending summer school. The math test includes questions on number
sense and operations, algebra, geometry, measurement, and statistics. Tests in the earlier grades emphasize more
basic content such as number sense and operations, while later tests focus on advanced topics such as algebra and
geometry. The ELA test is designed to assess students on three learning standards–information and understanding,
literary response and expression, critical analysis and evaluation–and includes multiple-choice and short-response
sections based on a reading and listening section, along with a brief editing task. Content breakdown by grade and
additional exam information is currently available at http://www.emsc.nysed.gov/osa/pub/reports.shtml.
21tion designation. By including these covariates we attempt to control for factors which plausibly
inﬂuence changes in behavior and might be correlated with rank.
Our estimates of the link between changes in rank and changes in behavior are displayed in
Figure 9. Independent of whether we calculate rank based on ELA or math scores, the behavior
of students whose rank decreases in going from elementary to middle school worsens signiﬁcantly
compared to students whose relative standing improves. A student experiencing a 50 percentile
decline in rank is approximately ﬁve percentage points more likely to have a behavioral incident
on record than a student whose rank improves by 50 percentiles–with the estimated eﬀect being
slightly larger if we calculate rank based on math scores than if we do so based on ELA scores.
Given sample means (and standard deviations) of .087 (.282) for sixth grade and .049 (.215) in ﬁfth
grade, our estimates are non-trivial in size.
Although the NYCPS data allow us control for a students’ natural proclivities to cause trouble
by relating changes in behavior to changes in rank induced by the transition to middle school, there
exists the possibility that our results are driven by systematic school choice. That is, students who
chose an academically less challenging environment might have experienced less of an increase in
behavioral problems, even if their rank had not improved.
To address the concern of systematic sorting into schools, we instrument for a student’s change in
rank with their predicted change in rank based on the school they were zoned to attend (given their
residential address).22 More speciﬁcally, we estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS) speciﬁcations
corresponding to:
∆ = ∆ + X0
 +  +     +  ,( 1 3 )
where the ﬁrst stage is given by
∆ = d ∆ + X0
 +  +     + ,
and d ∆ denotes student ’s counterfactual change in rank at the beginning of sixth grade had
all students attended the schools for which they were zoned. More speciﬁcally, let −1 denote
student ’s test score in ﬁf t hg r a d ea n dl e trank (,−1) be the percentile ranking of a student with
score −1 among the set of students , given their respective test scores at  − 1. Then,





where −1 and  are the sets of students who are zoned for the same elementary and middle
school as , respectively.
Table 1 presents 2SLS estimates of the partial correlation between school rank and behavior,
as well as the corresponding OLS estimates for comparison. In panel A we use ELA scores to
construct rank, whereas math scores are used in panel B. Based on the OLS point estimates one
22For more information on New York’s school choice plan, see http://schools.nyc.gov/ChoicesEnrollment/default.htm.
22would expect a student experiencing a 50 percentile decline in rank to be circa 3.5 (panel A) or
5—6 (panel B) percentage points more likely to have a behavioral incident on record than a student
whose rank improves by 50 percentiles–consistent with our previous semi-parametric results.
Due to the large number of observations, our OLS estimates are very precise. Unfortunately,
this is not the case when we estimate equation (13) by 2SLS. Although the ﬁrst stage F-statistic
is well above conventional critical values (Stock and Yogo 2005), our instrument explains very
little residual variation in the excluded variable, as evidenced by small values of Shea’s 2 (Shea
1997). One potential explanation for this is that only 46.0% (53.6%) of students attend the middle
(elementary) school for which they are zoned.
Nevertheless, not including school ﬁxed eﬀects, the 2SLS estimates are remarkably similar to
their OLS counterparts; and statistically signiﬁcant at 1%-level. If, however, we include school
ﬁxed eﬀects, the point estimates shrink by more than half and are statistically indistinguishable
from zero, though still negative. Given that our instrument, d ∆, explains less than one percent
of the residual variation in ∆ when school ﬁxed eﬀects are included, we strongly urge caution
when interpreting the results presented in Table 1. In order to better account for the possibility of
bias due systematic sorting of students into schools, we turn the National Education Longitudinal
Study.
B. Evidence From the National Educational Longitudinal Study
The National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS) was initiated in 1988 with a cohort of
24,599 eighth graders, who were then resurveyed through four follow-ups in 1990, 1992, 1994, and
2000. The available information on these students covers a wide range of topics including: school,
work, and home experiences; educational resources and support; the role in education of their
parents and peers; neighborhood characteristics; educational and occupational aspirations; as well
as other student perceptions. For the ﬁrst three waves, students also completed achievement tests in
reading, social studies, mathematics and science. In addition to collecting information on students’
course work and grades in high school as well as postsecondary transcripts, their teachers, parents,
and school administrators were also surveyed. Appendix Table 2 displays summary statistics for
all variables we use in our analysis.
We examine NELS data from 1988 and 1990, when students were in eighth and tenth grade. An
important limitation of the NELS data is that only 25 students per school were surveyed, yielding a
noisy measure of rank. To lessen the impact of measurement error, we limit our sample to students
in classrooms with at least ﬁve observations.23 Yet, NELS allows us take advantage of the fact
that the data include teacher reports on behavior and student self-reported grades from exactly
two subjects in the same year. By using a model that relates changes in a student’s behavior across
classrooms to changes in her rank we can implicitly account for students’ natural tendencies to cause
trouble and rule out that systematic sorting into schools drives our results.24 More speciﬁcally, we
23We obtain qualitatively identical results for alternative threshold levels of ten and zero.
24Students strategically sorting into classrooms based on other unobservables is still a potential concern.
23estimate a model of the form
∆ = (∆)+X0
 +  +  (14)
where  is an indicator for whether the teacher reported that the student had any behavioral
problems, and ∆ refers to the diﬀerence in this indicator across subjects within the same year.
Teachers were asked whether the student had a problem in any of six diﬀerent categories: the
student performed below his ability, the student did not complete homework, the student was
frequently absent, the student was frequently tardy, the student was inattentive, or the student
was disruptive. Our indicator variable is equal to one if the teacher reported that the student
had at least one of these behavioral problems. Note: the NELS measure of behavioral problems
encompasses a far more benign set of ‘oﬀenses’ than those typically reported in NYCPS. We use
student self-reported grades to compute subject-speciﬁcr a n k,a n dl e t∆ denote the diﬀerence
in these ranks across subjects within the same year. Moreover, X includes: the mean score across
subjects from the same year and its square, race, sex, English Language Learner status, indicator
variables for parents’ marital status, indicator variables for parents’ education, indicator variables
for school type (public, Catholic, or other private), indicator variables for school location (urban,
suburban, or rural), indicator variables for socioeconomic status quartiles, birth year indicators,
and birth month indicators;  marks a grade level ﬁxed eﬀect.
As was the case in the NYCPS data, we ﬁnd that changes in a student’s rank within a social
market are related to changes in her behavior (see Figure 10). For instance, students whose rank
is 50 percentiles lower in English class than in Math class are estimated to be approximately ten
percentage points more likely to act out in the former than the latter. Taken at face value rank
appears to have a substantial inﬂuence on behavior.25
Broadly summarizing, the results presented in this section suggest that students’ behavior
deteriorates as their academic rank declines. The empirical evidence is thus consistent with a
comparative advantage approach to social interactions.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
While social scientists have long been concerned with the inﬂuence of social interactions, empirical
estimates of peer eﬀects vary widely in the literature. Using diﬀerent sources of (plausibly) exoge-
nous variation some studies ﬁnd negligible eﬀects, others ﬁnd eﬀects that are positive and linear in
mean peer characteristics, and occassionally peer eﬀects have been found to be negative. We de-
velop a Roy model of social interactions which, through comparative advantage, has the potential to
25In NELS the sample mean (and standard deviation) of our indicator for having at least on behavioral incident
is .427 (.495) in math, .402 (.490) in history, .426 (.495) in science, and .429 (.495) in English class. Every student
has information on at most two of these subjects. See also Table A.2 and the description of NELS in the Data
Appendix. Instead of using an indicator variable for whether the teacher reports any behavioral incidents, we have
also constructed a summary index of children’s behavior by factor analyzing diﬀerent teacher reported behaviors. For
both outcomes our results are qualitatively identical.
24provide a parsimonous explanation for the disparate empirical evidence. In our model ‘peer eﬀects’
arise endogenously due to the sorting of individuals within narrowly deﬁned social settings, such as
neighborhoods or classrooms. Consequently, the comparative advantage approach has important
implications for the (non)identiﬁcation of peer eﬀects–even if individuals are randomly assigned
to social markets. In addition, since an unobserved wage is the critical determinant of selection,
assigning students to an environment with higher academic abilities is no guarantee that they will
face higher wages for academic eﬀort. This places severe constraints on the external validity of any
randomized trial.
Our data exercise provides suggestive evidence that the key prediction distinguishing our model
from traditional approaches is borne out in two datasets. However, it is important to note that
other models which predict both positive and negative peer eﬀects, might also be able to reconcile
our empirical evidence as well as the existing literature.
At its core, our theory builds upon impressive literatures designed to understand the evolution of
earnings, the (hedonic) pricing of skills, and the assignment of workers to ﬁrms. The novelty in our
approach lies in the application of these classic methods to develop a theory of social interactions
to characterize equilibria in diﬀerent social markets. The insights emerging from this approach may
also be useful in understanding a variety of other social phenomena, one particular example being
identity choice.
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31A Appendix A: Data Appendix
A.1 New York City Public Schools
Demographic Variables
Demographic variables that should not vary from year to year (race, gender) were pulled from
New York City enrollment ﬁles from 2003/04 through 2008/09, with precedence given to the most
recent ﬁles. Race consisted of the following categories: black, Hispanic, white, Asian, and other
race. These categories were considered mutually exclusive. The “other race” category consisted of
students who were coded as “American Indian.” Gender was coded as male, female, or missing.
Demographic variables that may vary from year to year (free lunch status, English Language
Learner status, and special education designation) were only pulled from the enrollment ﬁle corre-
sponding to the same year as the observation. A student was considered eligible for free lunch if he
was coded as “A” or “1” in the raw data, which corresponds to free lunch, or “2”, which corresponds
to reduced-price lunch. A student was considered non-free lunch if the student was coded as a “3” in
the NYC enrollment ﬁle, which corresponds to full price lunch. All other values, including blanks,
were coded as missing. For English Language Learner status, a student was given a value of one if
he was coded as “Y” for the limited English proﬁciency variable. All other students in the NYC
data were coded as zero for English Language Learner status. Special education was coded similarly.
New York State Test Scores
NYC state test scores were constructed from the NYC test score ﬁles for 2003/04 through
2008/09 for English/Language Arts (ELA) and math. School-wide rankings were constructed based
on these test scores.
Behavior
The number of behavioral incidents for each student was determined from NYC ﬁles listing
all recorded behavioral incidents from 2004/05 through 2008/09. Students not listed in this ﬁle
but with a valid test score from the same year were assumed to have zero behavioral incidents.
We constructed a behavioral incident indicator with a value of one if the student was listed for a
behavioral incident in the ﬁle from the relevant year, zero if the student had a valid test score from
the same year, and missing otherwise.
A.2 National Educational Longitudinal Study
Demographic Variables
Demographic variables were taken from the baseline year of the survey. These included: race,
sex, English Language Learner status, parents’ marital status, parents’ education, school type
(public, Catholic, or other private), school location (urban, suburban, rural), socioeconomic status,
birth month, and birth year.
32Behavior
Behavior variables were constructed using data from teacher reports on individual students.
Teachers were asked to indicate whether the student had problems in each of the following areas:
the student performs below his ability, the student does not complete homework, the student is
frequently absent, the student is frequently tardy, the student is inattentive, or the student is
disruptive. In the baseline year (eighth grade), each student had one teacher report from either
Math or Science and another from either English or History, for a total of two teacher reports.
Similarly, each student had two reports from the ﬁrst follow-up year (tenth grade). Teacher reports
were also administered in the second follow-up year (twelfth grade) but only in one subject, so
these reports are excluded from our analysis, which takes advantage of within-year across-subject
variation. For each student, we constructed an indicator that is equal to one if the student’s teacher
reports that the student has a problem in at least one of the six categories and zero otherwise. The
outcomes used for our analysis are the within-year diﬀerences across subjects in the behavioral
indicator.
Grades
The dataset contains self-reported grades for the baseline, ﬁrst follow-up, second follow-up years.
In the baseline year, students were asked to report for each subject (Math, Science, English, and
History) whether their grades since sixth grade had been “mostly A’s (90-100),” “mostly B’s (80-
89),” “mostly C’s (70-79),” “mostly D’s (60-69),” or “mostly below D (below 60).” Similarly, in
the ﬁrst follow-up year, students were asked to report for each subject whether their grades from
ninth grade until now were “mostly A’s,” “about half A’s and half B’s,” “mostly B’s,” “about half
B’s and half C’s,” “mostly C’s,” “about half C’s and half D’s,” “mostly D’s,” or “mostly below
D.” These responses were converted to the average of the corresponding grade point values on a
4.0 scale, where 1.0 corresponds to D, 2.0 corresponds to C, 3.0 corresponds to B, and 4.0 corre-
sponds to A. These grade values were used to compute a student’s percentile rank within each class.
Test Scores
The dataset contains test scores for each student from Math, Science, English, and History
for each year. We construct a test score control that is the mean of the test scores from the two
subjects for which there are teacher reports in the baseline year and ﬁr s tf o l l o w - u py e a r .W ea l s o
construct its square and use both as controls in our estimates.
33B Appendix B: Additional Results
B.1 Optimal Sorting in the Presence of Comparative Advantage
We conclude our modelling exercise by considering how a social planner interested in maximizing
student’s utility from social interactions would sort a ﬁxed set of children into classrooms taking
comparative advantage into account. Let the set of children have unit mass, and let their relative
ability,  ≡ 
 , be distributed according to the cumulative distribution function Φ. For tractability,
assume there are only two classrooms, and capital is ﬁxed. Both the nerd and the troublemaking
sectors within each classroom are competitive, and industry production functions are concave in
labor.
With respect to the assignment of nerd and troublemaker labor to classrooms and industries
the solution to the social planner’s problem coincides with the allocation that would obtain in a
competitive market in which children can switch classrooms and sectors costlessly. To see this note
that as ﬁrms in each sector earn zero proﬁts and the price of output remains ﬁxed, maximizing
total utility is equivalent to maximizing total output. The competitive market outcome ensures
maximal output by equalizing the marginal product of labor across sectors and classrooms. From















































































2 ) denotes the marginal individual if there are exactly 
1 + 
2 eﬃciency units









0  (). Notice, together with a market clearing condition, equations (15)—(17) are also suf-
ﬁcient. The ﬁrst and second condition respectively state that the marginal products of nerds and
troublemakers must be equal across classrooms. If not, total output, and hence the payment to
group members, could be increased by reallocating labor from one classroom to the other. As
there are no wage diﬀerences across classrooms within a sector, these conditions also imply that all
individuals are indiﬀerent between classrooms. The third condition ensures that the labor supply
to each sector supports the prevailing wages as an equilibrium. That is, the troublemaker with the
highest relative nerd skill has to be indiﬀerent between the two sectors. The last condition must
hold if the solution to the planner’s problem is interior, as otherwise total utility could be increased
if the marginal troublemaker became a nerd, or vice versa.
Proposition 2 If there exists an interior allocation with nerds and troublemakers in each classroom
that satisﬁes equations (15)—(17) and market clearing, then it is the unique optimum to the planner’s
34problem.
Proof. Let  ≡ 
1 + 
2 , and substitute out 
2 in (16). Holding  ﬁxed, the left-hand side
is decreasing and the right-hand side is increasing in 
1 by concavity of the production functions.
Given that the solution is interior, we can thus uniquely determine the amount of troublemaker labor




. By the Implicit Function
Theorem 
1 is continuously diﬀerentiable in a neighborhood around . Totally diﬀerentiating (16)





 1. For any  we can determine
the marginal individual, ∗ ¡
¢
,f r o me q u a t i o n( 3 ) .
Similarly, deﬁne  ≡
R 1
∗() Φ−1
 (),w h e r eΦ denotes the cumulative distribution function
of , and substitute out 
2 in equation (15). Again, concavity of the production functions implies
that there can only exist one 









 0. Since the left-hand
side of (17) is increasing and the right-hand side is decreasing in ,w ec a nd e t e r m i n eas i n g l e








into equation (17). With , 
1 ,a n d
1 in
hand, market clearing implies unique values for 
2 ,a n d
2 .
This shows that there exists at most one interior allocation satisfying equations (15)—(17) and
market clearing. To see that this allocation, if it exists, must be the unique optimum, note that at
a n yo t h e rp o i n ta tl e a s to n eo ft h et h r e ee q u a t i o n sa b o v em u s tb ev i o l a t e d ,w h i c hm e a n st h a tt o t a l
output can be increased by reallocating labor across sectors or classrooms.
Comparative statics follow from (15)—(17). For instance, suppose the troublemaking technology
in classroom 1,i . e . 












 0. For equation (17) to
continue to hold,  must increase, whereas 
2 , 
1 ,a n d
2 decrease for all marginal products to
equalize and the market to clear. Not surprisingly, the social planner would assign more children
to become troublemakers (reallocating some of them from classroom 2 to 1 in the process), and
fewer to become nerds.
However, there could also be cases in which a corner solution obtains. Intuitively, for this to
happen there must exist large productivity diﬀerences between sectors or classrooms. For instance,





















would not assign any troublemakers, i.e. children for whom Φ−1 ¡
∗()
¢
, to classroom 2,
but all of them to classroom 1 instead. A similar inequality might deﬁne a corner solution for
nerds. It is important to note that equation (17) changes if we are at a corner, but it must
continue to hold in modiﬁed form if there are to be both nerds and troublemakers at all. E.g.,





















The equations above suggest a very simple intuition: The nature (and shape) of group pro-
duction is critical in determining optimal sorting. At an abstract level, three general insights are
gleaned. First, if there are two classrooms (or neighborhoods) that have equal production tech-
nologies and capital, the quantity of eﬃciency units will be equalized across classrooms. Note, this
35does not imply that there must be the same number of nerds in each classroom–just the same
number of eﬀective units. This may imply one super nerd in one classroom and several lesser nerds
in another.
Second, if there are classrooms that are quite diﬀerent–one promoting nerd production (an
abundance of textbooks) and another favoring the production of troublemaking (sharp scissors)–
there may be interesting corner solutions to the optimal sorting problem. All nerds should be
placed in their preferred classroom and troublemakers in the other.
Third, suppose there exist classrooms with heterogenous production technology and mobile
capital. In this case, a social planner will combine nerds, more eﬀective nerd technology, and nerd
capital until the marginal products are equalized across classrooms. Whether or not there are
corner solutions depends on how large diﬀerences in the ﬁxed factors of production are.
B.2 Bundling and -dimensional Skill
In Section 2 we have developed a model of social interactions in which individuals with two distinct
types of ability choose between two peer groups, each of which only values one particular skill. In
this appendix we treat the general case in which individuals posses  skills and choose between
 sectors, which potentially value all (or some subset of) skills. In doing so we rely heavily on
Heckman and Scheinkman (1987), both in notation and style.
Let the vector of skill endowments of individual  ∈  =[ 0 1] begivenbyσ()=[ 1() ()]
,
and assume that the functions  :  → R+ are measurable and bounded for all  ∈ {1}.
For ease of notation dispose of group speciﬁc technology as well as capital, and let output of peer
group  ∈ {1 } in sector  ∈ {1} be given by the production function (a
),w h i c h
is assumed to be once continuously diﬀerentiable and admit ﬁnite ﬁrst derivatives. a
 denotes the
total eﬃciency units of diﬀerent skills used by group . That is, a peer group consisting of the set
of members 







Given a set of ×1 vectors w denoting the compensation of skill in each sector, peer groups choose
skill inputs to maximize proﬁts









and agents join the sector oﬀering the highest social income





Note that individuals ‘sell’ all of their skill endowments to a single group. This form of bundling
is the distinctive aspect of Heckman and Scheinkman (1987), and may result in skill prices varying
across sectors. Without such variation individuals would be indiﬀerent between sectors, rendering
their choice problem moot.
36A. Concavity in Production
Before characterizing the equilibrium we ﬁrst introduce some terminology.
Deﬁnition 3 An allocation is a partition of  into disjoint measurable subsets 
 with  ∈
{1 } and  ∈ {1}.
Deﬁnition 4 A feasible state is a set of vectors a
,  ∈ {1 },  ∈ {1},f o rw h i c ht h e r e





 σ(). For any feasible state let a =
R
 σ() denote the
total eﬃciency units of skill used in sector .
Deﬁnition 5 A competitive equilibrium is an allocation with an associated  ×  wage matrix
w =[ ],  ∈ {1},  ∈ {1}, such that:





solves maxa (a) − aw.
(ii) Agents maximize their social income. That is, for almost all  ∈ ,  ∈  = ∪
=1
 implies
σ()w ≥ σ()w0 for all 0 ∈ {1}.
Notice that the ﬁrst and second condition together imply that a peer group in sector  cannot
achieve higher proﬁts by hiring a subset of individuals  ⊆ 0 from sector 0 at wage rates w0.
If production is concave in inputs then any optimal allocation must assign equal amounts of skill
to all (identical) ﬁrms within a sector. The following two lemmas from Heckman and Scheinkman
(1987) greatly simplify the search for competitive equilibria on the industry level.
Lemma 6 For all  ∈ {1 },  ∈ {1},i fa
 is feasible, then a
 = −1
 a is feasible as
well.
Proof. See Heckman and Scheinkman (1987).
Lemma 7 The set of feasible industry states
 =
½




=1 =  ∩ 0 = ∅ if  6= 0
¾
is convex.
Proof. See Heckman and Scheinkman (1987).












s.t. a =( a1a) ∈ .
37As (18) is a convex optimization problem by Lemma 2 and concavity of , the following necessary








e a − a0

¢
≥ 0 for all a0 ∈ .( 1 9 )
Note that, for all e aa0 ∈ ,
P
=1 (e a − a0
)=0, since feasibility requires all skill to be employed.











for all 0 ∈ {1},








for all  ∈ {1}.
In such a case bundling imposes no binding constraint on the problem, i.e. e a∈ Int(), and wages
are equal in all sectors of the economy. Therefore, agents are indiﬀerent between sectors.
Diﬀerences in production technologies or factor immobility, however, might very well preclude
marginal productivities from being equalized across sectors–especially in the case of social inter-
actions in which it is perceivable that some peer groups have no use for certain skills.
As an example, recall the 2 × 2 case of Section 2. In this model a nerd possesses  () units
of troublemaking ability, which must be employed in the nerd sector; despite the marginal product
of troublemaking skill being zero in the nerd and strictly positive in the troublemaking sector. In
such cases bundling does impose binding constraints, and e a∈Bd().26 If skill endowments are
suﬃciently diverse for peer groups to employ more than one ‘type’ of agent, i.e. individuals with
distinct combinations of skill, then wages cannot be equalized across sectors.




0(0) for some 0 ∈ {1},b o t ho f








0 . Competition among groups


























































=1 ∇ deﬁnes a hyperplane to the feasible set at  a.
27T h es a m ec o n c l u s i o nh o l d si f
()
0() = ∞ due competiton among ﬁrms.















= 00.( 2 1 )
Since bundling prevents marginal products from being equalized, (20) and (21) imply wage diﬀer-
ences across sectors. With wages diﬀering across sectors most agents are not indiﬀerent. Mathe-
matically, the set of agents in sector  is then given by
 =
©
 ∈ |σ()w ≥ σ()w0 for all 0 ∈ {1}
ª
,
and in σ-space the set of agents who choose  forms a convex cone (through the origin).
B. Convexity in Production
As mentioned in Section 2, if production is convex in skill inputs we cannot assume marginal
product pricing because peer groups would incur losses. With increasing returns to scale on the
peer group level a competitive equilibrium in the usual sense does not exist. However, under the
assumption that new peer groups can form costlessly within a sector (free entry), a zero-proﬁt
condition helps determine the equilibrium.
Moreover, under the assumption of external increasing returns to scale (see Section 2) wages in
a sector must be equal to the marginal product of labor at the ﬁrm level (which is smaller than
that at the industry level). Hence, wages in sector  are given by
w = ∇(a
|a)=∇(a0
 |a).( 2 2 )
Since we are only interested in the allocation of labor across industries, in what followes we
abstract from the matching of agents to individuals groups within a sector. In Appendix B.3 we
endogenize group size and groups’ hierarchies.
Letting  (·) denote the industry production function net of ﬁxed costs and using (22), the
equilibrium allocation of labor, e a, and number of peer groups, e l, must satisfy
0=Π
³




0 if ﬁrms don’t enter and e  =0
(e a e ) − w
 e as otherwise
,f o ra l l,





= 0.( 2 3 )
Equation (22) implies that individual groups are price takers, which is only realistic if there
are a large number of them within each sector. To sidestep technical diﬃculties associated with
discreteness in l,w ea l l o w to be a real number. One might think thinks of  as the mass of ﬁrms
within sector .
39Proposition 8 If  ∈ R+ and Π (a )  0 for some sector  and some ,w h e r ea =
R
 σ(),








= 0. Hence, an equilibrium
exists.
Proof. To prove existence, we show existence in a trivial case. For all 0 6=  let e a0 = 0 and set
 =0 .H e n c e ,Π0 =0for all 0 6= . For equation (23) to be satisﬁed and equilibrium to obtain




=0 . Due to the ﬁxed cost of production that all ﬁrms




 0 for some  large enough.









As before, wages are determined by the marginal product of labor at the ﬁrm level, i.e. equation
(22), and the set of agents in a sector is given by
 =
©
 ∈ |σ()w ≥ σ()w0 for all 0 ∈ {1}
ª

B.3 Endogenous Hierarchy and Group Size
As noted earlier, the potential extensions to our basic economic model of peer eﬀects are endless.
In this section we exposit a rather poignant extension based on Rosen (1982). This allows us
to investigate endogenous hierarchies within groups, and to derive the number and size of peer
groups within a sector. In our previous analysis, agents could choose one of two sectors: nerds or
troublemakers. In this extension, agents can choose to be with the main troublemaking group or
branch out and create their own troublemaking organization. In equilibrium only the most able
agents will serve as leaders because followers’ productivity depends positively on leader ability.
Moreover, peer group size is an increasing function of leader ability. In what follows, we abstract
from the sorting of agents into sectors, but instead focus on the organization of individual peer
groups within a given sector. In doing so we borrow heavily from Rosen (1982), both in notation
and style.
Suppose that within each peer group there are two types of agents: one leader and followers.
Let  () ∈ R+ denote the productivity of an agent who is deemed a ‘follower’ in the group. Let
 denote the skill of the group’s leader, which is also measured in eﬃciency units and varies from
agent to agent. We think of this as the ability to lead others to a common purpose. () denotes
the amount of time that a leader spends with follower .






where (·) and (·) are smooth, twice continuously diﬀerentiable functions, that are increasing and
concave in each of their arguments. The key assumption embodied in this choice of functional form
is that a follower produces more output under a better leader and if the leader spends more time
40with him. In this setup leader’s time is the scarce factor of production that in equilibrium limits
group size and prevents the formation of one large group led by the most able agent. The total












where both the set of followers, ,a n d() are endogenously determined.
The description of production possibilities is completed by a speciﬁcation of factor supplies.
Each agent is completely described by a tupel of endowed ability (). Following Rosen (1982)
we analyze a special case in which abilities follow a nonhomogeneous latent one factor structure:
 ()= +  () (24)
 =  +  () (25)
where  and ,  ∈ {}, are positive constants, and  () ∈ R+ represents ‘general ability’. The
distribution of  in the population follows ()
Given the quality and quantity of human inputs, the group’s production function is deﬁned by
the allocation of leadership eﬀort (·) that maximizes total output:




















w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a te a c hl e a d e rh a s =1units of time, and  is a standard Lagrange multiplier.




exhibits constant returns to scale. Then










=  for all  (26)
With  ﬁxed, (26) implies that () ()=,w h e r e is a constant. Thus, leadership eﬀort
is allocated in proportion to follower’s skill: ()= () Aggregating across all workers gives
 =
R
∈ () ≡ ,w h e r e ≡
R
∈ () is the total amount of eﬃciency units among the







 ()() =  () ()
The market assignment of individuals to positions within groups is based on comparative advan-
28Second order conditions are satisﬁed by concavity.
41tage. Constant returns to scale in 
¡
¢
and perefect substitutability of eﬃcient follower labor
imply that only rank order needs to be determined and that questions of sorting within ranks and
groups are irrelevant. Thus, in this model, an agent must decide whether to be a follower in a more
successful peer group using  (),o rt ol e a dh i so w ng r o u po fp e e r su s i n g Market equilibrium
determines the price per eﬃciency unit of follower skill,  and the leader reward function (),i . e .
()=m a x

{ ()() − }
Ignoring nonpecuniary diﬀerences between positions, an agent’s choice rests on which alternative
yields the larger social income, given wages and his latent ability.
Rosen (1982) demonstrates that an analytical solution is available if one assumes that endowed
talents follow (24). Using this fact, it is straightforward to show that all individuals above a
critical ability threshold, ∗ choose to lead their own peer groups and individuals below ∗ serve




where () is the amount of labor lead by  The total supply of production labor, i.e. the amount










Equilibrium is thus deﬁned by a function (), representing the optimal allocation of production
labor to each active  and a partition ∗ that maximizes (27) subject to market clearing, i.e.




















and the condition for the extensive margin, ∗ is
∗ − (∗)=∗ (31)
42where ∗ ≡ (∗) marks the marginal leader, ∗ ≡  (∗) is his skill as follower, and (∗) is
the potential labor to be lead by him. ∗ denotes the total output of his peer group. Assuming
()  0 over the range of  (30) requires that the marginal product of labor is equalized for all
observed  Thus,  is the economy wide marginal productof , equal to the wage, , in equilibrium.
T h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 3 1 )i st h ep a y o ﬀ accruing to the leader of the marginal peer group and the
right hand side is his opportunity cost, i.e. what he would earn as a follower. The partition is
determined by the absence of rents at the margin, as typical.
The preceding discussion shows that in equilibrium only the most able agent’s will lead their
own groups (with the most talented leaders commanding more eﬃcient follower labor), while all
others will serve as followers in some peer group and are rewarded based on their marginal product.
Note that the peer group itself retains no proﬁts. Leaders receive the whole surplus after paying
all other factors of production. Allowing for multi-level hierarchies is a straighforward extension of
the model above that is outlined in Rosen (1982).
B.4 Embedding the Roy Model in a Social Multiplier Framework
In this subsection, we cast our Roy model of social interaction into a general model of social
interactions. Let there be a continuum of agents with unit mass. Every agent is endowed with one
unit of (non-transferable) time. In the canonical model of social multipliers (see Becker and Murphy
2000, for example), agents derive utility from two diﬀerent kinds of activities, social and asocial.
Our principal departure from the usual framework is that we assume that there are two activities
in which agents can engage with their peers: studying or mischief. These activities are exclusive
and undertaken by separate social groups in one of two sectors: ‘nerds’ and ‘troublemakers’. The
utility derived from participating in a social activity depends on the total eﬀective labor supplied
to that sector only,  indexed by  ∈ {}, as well as another input we label ‘capital’, .
We allow capital to broadly represent any non-human input into groups’ production (e.g., school
quality, diligence of adult supervision, etc.).
Agents are heterogenous along two dimensions. Their varying size and strength yield diﬀerences
in the ability to cause trouble, whereas heterogeneity in cognitive ability implies diﬀerences in their
ability to be a true nerd. Let the continuous function ():[ 0 1] → R+ denote the eﬀective units
of ‘nerdiness’ that agent  is capable of contributing to the group (e.g., expertise in diﬀerential
geometry). Analogously, agent ’s troublemaking ability is given by ():[ 0 1] → R+.
To emphasize the importance of social activity selection in the estimation of peer eﬀects, we
model the eﬀective utility from time spent with nerds or troublemakers as perfect substitutes
()=()()( )+()()( ) (32)
We can then nest utility from social activities in a quasiconcave utility function that depends
on an individual’s social ‘production’ () as deﬁned in (32), asocial activities (), and atomistic
43agents take aggregate labor and capital conditions (LK) as given.
()=(()();LK) (33)
s.t. ()+()+()=1
With this formulation, we think of the marginal return to spending an additional eﬀective unit of
time with a social group as a ‘wage’ that is determined by aggregate social market conditions. In
the absence of a second activity, this is the standard framework for analyzing social interactions.
The ‘social multiplier’ is generated the assumption that

  0.29
With perfect substitutability between social activities, utility maximization implies a simple
cutoﬀ rule that separates individuals between social sectors in a manner analogous to a classical Roy
(1951) model. Let () ≡
()
() denote agent ’s skill as a nerd relative to that as a troublemaker,
and order agents such that 0() ≥ 0. Equilibrium ‘labor supply’ is determined by the set of agents
whose comparative advantage determines the sector of their social activity, and the marginal rate




= ()( ) (34)
Diminishing marginal utility implies that more skilled agents are more socially active within their
respective sector as their opportunity cost of asocial activity is higher. The agent indiﬀerent between





For any given equilibrium wage ratio, all individuals with index  ≥ ∗ join forces with the nerds,
and individuals with  ∗ become troublemakers. In our price theory of social interactions,
comparative (rather than absolute) advantage determines an individual’s choice of sector. Total







29To see this, suppose studying were the only social activity, and we were interested in the eﬀect of additional
school resources  on eﬀe c t i v et i m es p e n ts t u d y i n g =
 1






























While the numerator measures the average direct eﬀect of the additional resources on time spent studying, when














 )].( 3 7 )
Equations (36) and (37) characterize the supply side in the market for peers. A labor demand
schedule with respect to ∗ can be characterized as a curve that traces the marginal return per
unit of eﬀective time as the measure of the sector increases—taking the labor supply decisions
of inframarginal agents into consideration. The relationship between total labor supply in the
troublemaking sector and the position of the marginal agent is derived by taking the derivative of
37 with respect to ∗
∗




























The expression for the nerd sector is identical, but with a negative numerator to account for
the opposite eﬀect moving ∗ has on the measure of the group. The numerator is the mechanical
eﬀect of adding a new member to the sector, and the denominator accounts for the labor supply




always positive by the ﬁrst order condition (34). While eﬀective labor supply always increases with
the measure of the sector, whether the mechanical eﬀect is dampened or ampliﬁed depends on
whether the social wage increases or decreases with eﬀective labor in the sector. We turn to each
case in turn.
B.4.1 Diminishing Marginal Social Product of Labor in Both Sectors
In contrast with the ‘social multiplier’ approach in which it is assumed

  0, we begin with
the assumption that additional labor supply in a social sector reduces the marginal product of
participation,

  0—a common assumption for the theory of the ﬁrm. In our setting this would
correspond to a game—of math problems or bullying, for example—becoming less fun as the activity
has to be shared with more participants.30 As part of our analysis we introduce the ‘relative labor
demand curve’,  ():[ 0 1] → R+, a schedule that traces the relative marginal return of a unit of





The assumption of diminishing marginal product in both sectors guarantees that the relative
labor demand curve will be (weakly) downward sloping, as increasing the measure of the trouble-
30This holds for eﬀective units, regardless of the number of participants. A brilliant student answering all of the
questions or a talented athlete hogging the ball is an example of many eﬀective units concentrated in a single person
diminishing the social utility of participation for others.
45making sector with lower the numerator, which raising the denominator of (39).
B.4.2 Increasing Marginal Social Product of Labor in Both Sectors
As discussed above, the assumption that

  0 in a single social sector has been the focus of
much of the work on social interactions. Study groups allow students to beneﬁt from division of
labor on a lab project, and ensure individual students do not waste time stuck on a question to
which someone else in the group knows the answer. More troublemakers at a school can divert
teachers’ attention and thereby reduce others’ probability of punishment. We now consider the
nature of equilibria when there are two social sectors characterized by increasing marginal product.
Equation 38 shows that when

  0, the mechanical increase in labor supply from increasing
∗ is ampliﬁed by an increased labor supply from inframarginal agents due to the increased marginal
product of making trouble. Conversely, the accompanying decrease in labor in the nerd sector yields
an ampliﬁed decrease in the return to being a nerd. The relative demand schedule is therefore
upward sloping. This creates the potential for multiple equilibria along the lines of Becker (1991)
and DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998).
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A) Random Assignment B) Experimental Assignment
i
*'Figure 8: Reconciling Heterogenous Negative E⁄ects in the MTO Example with the Comparative
Advantage Approach
a) Boys, Old Neighborhood b) Boys, New Neighborhood









































δ(i)'Figure 9: The Relationship between Ordinal Rank and Behavioral Incidence, New York City Public
Schools
Notes: Panels show non-parametric estimates and the associated 95%-confidence intervals of the effect of a change in a 
student's class rank (in going from elementary to middle school) on the change in an indicator variable for whether she was 
involved in a behavioral incident, cf. equation (12). The top panel constructs rank based on English/Language Arts (ELA) 
test scores, whereas the lower one uses math test scores. Estimates are obtained using the differencing procedure in Yatchew 
(1998) and local-mean smoothing with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 10. Section 4.2 and the Data Appendix provide 
additional information on the exact econometric specification as well as the sample.Figure 10: The Relationship between Class Rank and Behavioral Incidence, National Educational
Longitudinal Study
Notes: The figure shows non-parametric estimates and the associated 95%-confidence intervals of the effect of 
differences in a student's course-specific rank on the difference in two course-specific behavioral outcomes, cf. 
equation (14). Estimates are obtained using the differencing procedure in Yatchew (1998) and local-mean 
smoothing with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 7.5. Section 4.2 and the Data Appendix provide additional 
information on the exact econometric specification as well as the sample.Table 1: Estimates of the Relationship between Ordinal Rank and Behavior
A. Ranking Based on ELA Test Scores
￿ Behavioral Incident ￿ Behavioral Incident
Independent Variable OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
￿Rank (￿100) -.033 -.036 -.047 -.022
(.003) (.003) (.017) (.041)
Test Score at Previous School (￿100) -.030 -.031 -.034 -.028
(.002) (.002) (.005) (.010)
Male .019 .019 .018 .019
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Black .007 .025 .006 .024
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.003)
Hispanic -.005 .005 -.006 .005
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Asian -.021 -.014 -.021 -.014
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Other Race .001 .022 -.004 .018
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.012)
Free Lunch .012 .011 .011 .011
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
English Language Learner -.010 -.009 -.011 -.009
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.004)
Special Education .010 .005 .006 .005
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.006)
Year Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed E⁄ects No Yes No Yes
First Stage F-Stat ￿ ￿ 5,117 1,224
Shea￿ s Partial R-Squared ￿ ￿ .027 .006
R-Squared .005 .062 .005 .062
Number of Observations 241,734 241,734 233,247 233,247
B. Ranking Based on Math Test Scores
￿Behavioral Incident ￿Behavioral Incident
Independent Variable OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
￿Rank (￿100) -.051 -.060 -.051 -.019
(.003) (.003) (.016) (.036)
Test Score at Previous School (￿100) -.027 -.030 -.027 -.023
(.002) (.002) (.004) (.006)
Male .022 .021 .021 .021
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Black .007 .024 .006 .024
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.003)
Hispanic -.005 .004 -.005 .004
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Asian -.017 -.010 -.017 -.012
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Other Race .003 .024 -.000 .021
(.012) (.011) (.012) (.012)
Free Lunch .013 .011 .013 .011
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
English Language Learner -.007 -.007 -.006 -.006
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Special Education .006 .001 .005 .003
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Year Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Fixed E⁄ects No Yes No Yes
First Stage F-Stat ￿ ￿ 7,155 1,903
Shea￿ s Partial R-Squared ￿ ￿ .036 .009
R-Squared .006 .061 .006 .060
Number of Observations 253,496 253,496 245,298 245,298
Notes: Entries are coe¢ cients and standard errors from estimating the linear model, equation (13),
by ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares, i.e. equation. The dependent variables is listed
at the top of each column. The instrument for ￿ Rank is the predicted change in rank based on school zoning regulations,
as explained in the text and the Data Appendix. Panel A calculates a student￿ s rank at his school based on ELA test scores,
whereas panel B does so for Math test scores. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
In addition to the variables included in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also
included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise de￿nition and source of each variable.Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics for NYCPS Data
Mean SD N
Change in behavioral incident indicator .042 .318 256,168
Change in rank (English/Language Arts) -.156 24.556 241,742
Change in rank (math) -.215 22.711 253,504
Previous year test score (English/Language Arts) 661.372 36.948 241,742
Previous year test score (math) 668.141 41.627 253,504
White .149 .356 256,159
Black .314 .464 256,159
Hispanic .394 .489 256,159
Asian .139 .346 256,159
Other race .004 .063 256,159
Male .507 .500 256,160
Female .493 .500 256,160
Free lunch .830 .376 210,290
English Language Learner .093 .290 253,641
Special education .087 .282 253,641
Behavioral incident indicator .089 .285 256,168
Previous year behavioral incidents .083 .531 256,168
Observation from 2004-05 school year .206 .405 256,168
Observation from 2005-06 school year .194 .395 256,168
Observation from 2006-07 school year .194 .396 256,168
Observation from 2007-08 school year .201 .401 256,168
Observation from 2008-09 school year .205 .403 256,168
Missing race .000 .006 256,168
Missing sex .000 .006 256,168
Missing free lunch status .179 .383 256,168
Missing English Language Learner status .010 .099 256,168
Missing special education status .010 .099 256,168
Missing previous year behavioral incidents .000 .000 256,168
Notes: Entries are means and standard deviations together with the number of
valid observations for each variable we use in the NYCPS data. For further
details about the NYCPS data see Section A.1 in the Data Appendix.Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics for NELS Data
Mean SD N
Di⁄erence in behavioral incident dummy (eighth grade) .007 .519 19,782
Di⁄erence in behavioral incident dummy (tenth grade) .008 .548 10,506
Behavioral incident dummy (eighth grade) .387 .487 19,782
Behavioral incident dummy (tenth grade) .557 .497 10,523
Di⁄erence in behavioral incident factor (eighth grade) .003 .951 19,709
Di⁄erence in behavioral incident factor (tenth grade) .016 .938 10,399
Behavioral incident factor (eighth grade) -.024 .983 19,761
Behavioral incident factor (tenth grade) -.020 .978 10,485
Di⁄erence in class rank (eighth grade) -.652 33.960 19,782
Di⁄erence in class rank (tenth grade) -.980 35.599 10,523
Mean test score (eighth grade) .060 .868 19,213
Mean test score squared (eighth grade) .757 .879 19,213
Mean test score (tenth grade) .093 .870 10,241
Mean test score squared (tenth grade) .765 .867 10,241
Mean test score squared (eighth grade) .757 .879 19,213
Mean test score squared (tenth grade) .765 .867 10,241
Male .497 .500 21,297
Female .503 .500 21,297
White .694 .461 21,297
Black .111 .314 21,297
Hispanic .118 .322 21,297
Asian .058 .233 21,297
Other race .020 .139 21,297
English Language Learner .027 .163 21,297
Parents married .721 .449 21,297
Parents divorced .105 .307 21,297
Parents separated .032 .177 21,297
Parents never married .021 .145 21,297
Other parents￿marital status .120 .326 21,297
Parents￿education: less than high school .096 .295 21,145
Parents￿education: high school graduate .192 .394 21,145
Parents￿education: some college .403 .490 21,145
Parents￿education: college graduate .153 .360 21,145
Parents￿education: M.A. .096 .295 21,145
Parents￿education: Ph.D., M.D., other .060 .238 21,145
Public school (eighth grade) .792 .406 21,297
Catholic school (eighth grade) .102 .303 21,297
Independent/other private school (eighth grade) .106 .308 21,297
School in urban area .289 .453 21,297
School in suburban area .421 .494 21,297
School in rural area .290 .454 21,297
Lowest socioeconomic quartile .229 .420 15,897
Second-lowest socioeconomic quartile .242 .428 15,897
Second-highest socioeconomic quartile .236 .425 15,897
Highest socioeconomic quartile .293 .455 15,897
Missing sex .000 .000 21,297
Missing race .000 .000 21,297
Missing English Language Learner status .000 .000 21,297
Missing parents￿marital status .000 .000 21,297
Missing parents￿education .007 .084 21,297
Missing school type .000 .000 21,297
Missing school area .000 .000 21,297
Missing socioeconomic quartile .254 .435 21,297
Missing mean test score (eighth grade) .029 .167 19,782
Missing mean test score (tenth grade) .027 .162 10,523
Notes: Entries are means and standard deviations together with the number of
valid observations for each variable we use in the NELS data. For further
details about the NELS data see Section A.3 in the Data Appendix, or the NELS
website currently located at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/nels88